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CONTRACTING FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
FLETCHER v. WESTERN NATIONAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY'
On August 7, 1970, the California Court of Appeal for the Fourth
District, in an opinion by Justice Kaufman, handed down a decision which
has, to date, caused a certain amount of consternation in the insurance
business. Not only will the holding of the court have widespread conse-
quences upon the insurance industry and the insurance buying public,
but it may affect contracting parties in all forms of business and pri-
vate transactions. In Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Com-
pany, the Appeals Court affirmed a Superior Court judgment awarding
$60,000 compensatory and $180,000 punitive damages against a disa-
bility insurer and $10,000 punitive damages against its claims supervisor
personally, for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Appel-
late Court held that, independent of the tort of intentional infliction, a bad
faith and malicious refusal to make payments under an insurance policy
by a disability insurer, who was bound by an implied-in-law duty of good
faith with respect to its insured, constituted a tortious interference with a
protected property interest of the policy holder. The insured was com-
pensated for economic loss as well as emotional distress resulting from
this conduct.
2
In view of the large volume of business done by insurance companies,
judicial interpretations of the relationship between insurer and insured
have and will continue to have a great effect on a substantial portion of
the populace. In light of these interpretations, an examination of Fletcher
is appropriate.
U.L. Fletcher was a forty-one year old scrap operator with a wife and
eight children. He worked seventy to eighty hours a week at a job that re-
quired heavy manual labor. His monthly income was $1358.70, based
on his $289.00 per week wage and a $116.00 per month income re-
ceived from the rental of Santa Ana property. 3 In order to protect him-
self and his family in the event he were disabled, Fletcher purchased a
disability insurance policy from defendant Western National. The policy
provided for payments of $150.00 per month to Fletcher should he be-
1 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
2 Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
3 These figures are calculated by multiplying $289.00 per week, Id. at 386, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 83, by 4.3 to reach a monthly figure of $1242.70 and adding thereto $116.00
per month rental income. Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85. Appellant's Petition for
Rehearing at 28 n.13, Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
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come totally disabled because of sickness or injury. In the event of sick-
ness, such payments were limited to a maximum of two years. In the
event of injury, the maximum period in which the insured would remain
eligible to receive payments was thirty years.
After regular payment of the premiums for two years, Fletcher sus-
tained injuries while lifting a 361 pound bale of rubber. He was unable
to work as a result of a hernia condition, for which he was surgically
treated. Pursuant to the policy, disability due to hernia was payable as a
sickness. Upon returning to work after the hernia surgery, Fletcher con-
tinued to have trouble with his back and was eventually placed on disabil-
ity by his employer. Upon submitting a second proof of loss to the insur-
ance company, monthly payments were resumed to Fletcher, although it
was not made clear to him under which provision of the policy payments
were being continued.4
Upon a thorough investigation of Mr. Fletcher's situation, Amason,
Western National's new claims supervisor, immediately set out to find a
way of minimizing or avoiding Fletcher's claim.5 He sent Fletcher four
letters around which the litigation centered. The content of these letters in-
cluded the following: (a) rationalizations that Fletcher's condition originated
from a congenital ailment and should therefore be paid under the Sickness
Provision of the policy, which limited payments to a maximum of two
years; (b) accusations of a material misrepresentation on the part of Fletcher
in filling out this application for insurance coverage;6 (c) a denial of any
liability by Western National under the policy and a demand for the re-
turn of payments made to Fletcher. Western later modified its request by
proposing that Fletcher keep the payments already made to him, $2250,
in consideration of the cancellation of the policy and the execution by
Fletcher of a full release; and (d) a statement that Western National
would be willing to take any action necessary to have the policy cancelled
in the event that Fletcher failed to accede to its so called "compromise"
proposal.
At this point Fletcher brought an action against Western National based
4 Western National was informed by Fletcher's attending physician that he was
disabled because of his back condition resulting from his initial injury. 10 Cal. App.
3d at 387, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 183-84.
G The opinion notes that the investigator received a letter from one of the physi-
cians responding to an inquiry by the investigator in which it was stated: "I am sure
that you are well aware of the fact that Mr. Fletcher has a large family and if such
surgery [recommended for correction of Fletcher's injured back] were performed subse-
quently his employment outlook would be very poor to say the least." Id.
O This was done notwithstanding the complete absence of any investigation concern-
ing the possible congenital defect, the complete absence of any proof that Fletcher knew
about his condition, and in the face of information that Fletcher denied any previous
back trouble and any knowledge of such a pre-existing condition. See Id. at 393-94,
89 Cal. Rptr. at 87-88.
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primarily upon intentional infliction of emotional harm.7 The court found
that Western National, without probable cause for believing that Fletcher
made an intentional and material misrepresentation, embarked upon a
concerted course of conduct to induce Fletcher to surrender his insur-
ance policy or enter into a disadvantageous "settlement" of a nonexistent
dispute by means of false and threatening letters. It was also found that
by employing economic pressure at a time when Fletcher was unable to
meet his family's needs, the insurer acted maliciously and in bad faith by
refusing to pay Fletcher's legitimate claim.
Defendants conceded that their conduct was "deplorable and outra-
geous". 8  The jury awarded Fletcher $60,000 compe t damages, $640,
000 punitive damages against Western National and $ 0,00Ypunitive damages
against the claims' supervisor. Fletcher accepted a ieaigsion of the punitive
damage award against Western National down to the sum of $180,000. The
case reached the Court of Appeal based upon the denial of Western's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the intentional infliction
finding.
On appeal, counsel for appellant's arguments were most ingenious.0
He contended that: (1) If the action for intentional infliction were based
4ipon the sending of the letters, as the pleadings suggested, causation could
not be shown; and (2) If the action was based upon appellant's bad faith
refusal to pay, that action must sound only in contract. Neither compen-
satory damages for emotional distress nor punitive damages would be re-
coverable.' 0
7 Note that this is the only cause of action which proceeded to verdict and judg-
ment, and which was involved on appeal. The first cause, wherein Fletcher sought a
declaration that he was entitled to monthly payments of $150.00 under the "Injury"
provision of the policy so long as he should be totally disabled up to a maximum of
thirty years, was stipulated to judgment by Western National. The second cause sought
compensatory and punitive damages against both Western National and Amason, the
claims' supervisor, for their alleged fraud in inducing Fletcher to buy the policy. At
the conclusion of Fletcher's case, the court granted the insurer's motion for non-suit on
this second cause of action.
8 10 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
9 Appellant Western National made two other contentions which should be noted
yet will not be discussed herein: (1) That prejudicial error was to be found in the
jury instructions; and (2) that the damage awards, both compensatory and punitive,
were excessive. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 386, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 82.
10 See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 3300, 3302 (West 1970) and CAL. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 10111 (West 1955).
An argument against the allowance of recovery for Fletcher on any tort theory was
put forth. Brief for Appellant at 42-44, Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970). The essence of it was that the rule
of Erlich v. Etner, 224 Cal. App. 2d 69, 36 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1964), governed, and pro-
hibited the recovery of punitive damages. Compensatory damages are not recoverable
where there is no evidence of actual loss or damage to the plaintiff. "Since no actual
damages were proven, an award of punitive damages was, of course, improper." Id.
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Although the Court of Appeal affirmed, it did not directly confront these
two contentions. In the long run, it abandoned the intentional infliction
ground and relied instead on an alternative holding: Tortious interference
by a disability insurer with a protected property interest of its insured. Be-
cause there is an element of recognition by omission in the court's reasoning,
appellant's arguments merit more elaborate discussion.
I
Fletcher's action for intentional infliction was based upon two forms of
conduct: (1) the bad faith, malicious conduct of Western National in
writing the threatening and accusatory letters, thereby causing adverse ef-
fects on his emotional tranquility, and (2) the breach of the insurer's ob-
ligation to pay benefits due under a contract of disability insurance. 1
Though the latter contention is normally one of contract breach, recovery
in tort was endeavored. A discussion of this contention will temporarily
pre-empt comment upon the insurer's malicious conduct.
The court concluded that as a proximate result of Western's failure to
perform its obligations under the contract, Fletcher suffered both emo-
tional distress and economic losses.12  Conceding that "[in every case
of a contract breach, there is bound to be vexation and annoyance to one
or both of the contracting parties,"' 8 it does not necessarily follow that a
causal connection between the breach and compensable distress is auto-
matic. The court noted that were it not for Western National's bad faith
refusal to pay the monies due, Mr. Fletcher would not have suffered the
same degree of emotional distress and mental anxiety. Counsel for the
appellant suggested that the actual cause of Fletcher's economic loss and
mental distress was the disability itself, which was accompanied by a re-
sulting loss of income, and that the loss of the (disability) payments was
insignificant by comparison. He argued that it must necessarily follow
that there is no causal connection between the appellant's refusal to pay
and the respondent's emotional harm. 14 He maintained that prior to in-
at 75, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
Punitive damages are not recoverable where compensatory damages are not. Con-
tractor's Safety Assn. v. Cal. Comp. Ins., Co., 48 Cal. 2d 71, 77, 307 P.2d 626, 629
(1957).
11 Another cause of action was pleaded on the theory of a conspiracy between
appellants Western National and Amason. "In a discussion in chambers prior to the
taking of testimony it was apparently concluded that there could be no conspiracy be-
tween the corporate defendant and its employee acting within the scope of his employ-
ment [see Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1963)],
and the case proceeded as if the [respondent] had pleaded tortious conduct by both
[appellants on the intentional infliction count]." 10 Cal. App. 3d at 384-85 n.l. 89
Cal. Rptr. at 81-82 n.l.
12 Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
13 Jna-owski v. Mazzotta, 7 Mich. App. 483, 489, 152 N.W.2d 49, 51 (1967).
I' . court realized that emotional distress was to some extent caused by Fletcher's
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jury, Fletcher had a monthly income of $1358.70, which included in-
come derived from his Santa Ana property. In the event of total disabil-
ity, the payments due from Western were $150.00 per month for a max-
imim of thirty years. If Western National had done everything required
of it under the contract and paid the $150.00 promptly, thereby making
it innocent of both tort and breach of contract, Fletcher's income would
still have been reduced by some $974.00 per month.'15
The problem of the causal connection between the refusal to pay and
the compensated emotional harm, raised by this argument, is not particu-
larly troublesome. The jury awarded $60,000 compensatory damages,
$54,000 of which was the accelerated lump sum payment under the disa-
impecunious economic situation yet did not consider the situation to be the primary
cause of the distress. Interestingly enough, his specific economic losses, i.e. loss of an
Arizona property and late charges based on delinquency in making house payments,
were not considered compensable.
15 Appellant's Petition for Rehearing at 28-29, Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
A proximate cause analysis of the situation, focusing on appellant's argument above,
would yield that the insurer could not reasonably be expected to foresee any emo-
tional distress resulting from its performance.
A three pronged attack upon the tort of intentional infliction was attempted, based
on the threshold ground that the tort itself was not established. Western first tried to
demonstrate that their purported conduct was privileged (privilege to pursue their own
economic interests) and therefore excusable. This privilege would allow them to
assert their legal rights and to communicate its position in good faith to its insured
even though it is substantially certain that in doing so, emotional distress will be
caused. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, comment g and illus. 14 (1965); ci.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 773 (1939); and see generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTs
99-100 (3d ed. 1964). By pursuing its own economic interests, the appellant alluded
to settlement negotiations. The word settlement presupposes that there is a dispute.
Where there is no bona fide dispute between an insurer and its insured, it is difficult
to conceive of how a settlement can take place. At the outset of the trial, Western
National conceded that its conduct was outrageous and stipulated that the payments
were due. That conduct amounts to a tacit admission that no dispute existed. It
seems that the so called "settlement" negotiations (letters to Fletcher) were in essence
efforts by Western to take advantage of the tremendous difference in bargaining posi-
tions with reference to the economic positions of the parties.
Though there are strong public policy considerations favoring amicable settlement of
disputes, the facts of Fletcher reveal that there was no good faith dispute; there is no
public policy in favor of an attempt to coerce settlement of a non-existent dispute by
outrageous means. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 396, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90. Therefore, the
insurer's privilege was unequivocally defeated by its outward manifestations of bad
faith and malice.
Next the appellant urged that the testimony of respondent established that he was
but mildly upset by appellant's conduct and therefore not a victim of "severe" emo-
tional distress. Id. at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr.' at 90. The court disposed of this contention
by concluding that there was sufficient evidence from which emotional distress of the
requisite severity could be found. Id. at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
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bility contract.16 The jury, in effect, awarded $6,000 for Fletcher's emo-
tional harm. The question before the Court of Appeal, therefore, was
whether there existed substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.
17
Evidence was introduced to show that prior to the cessation of payments
by Western National but after Fletcher's disability, the insurer obtained an
investigation report with respect to Fletcher's situation at the time:
[Al of his income is going out to upkeep on his two homes, food for family
and expenses and medical bills. He is barely making ends meet and has no idea
of how many expenses he has exactly but stated generally that they were normal
household and family expense which seem to be more than he can manage with-
out slighting one or the other. (emphasis added)18
As to the effects of Western National's nonpayment, Fletcher testified that:
[H~e reduced his budget and kept trying to provide for his family; that he and his
family were required to eat macaroni, beans and potatoes; that he gained 47
pounds; that during the summer of 1967 his utilities were turned off for nonpay-
ment of charges and that he was required to "gather" money from friends and
neighbors to have them turned back on; ...that his wife was required to go to
work two days a week; and that, as a result, he had to take one of his daughters
out of school to tend to him and one small child for approximately two months on
those two days a week that his wife worked.' 9
The court found the above evidence sufficient to establish a causal link
between the insurer's failure to pay its contractual obligation and the in-
sured's resulting emotional distress.
20
16 See note 7 supra.
17 See 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90.
18 Id. at 389, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
19 Id. at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88.
20 Since this finding rests upon the tort of intentional infliction, a brief back-
ground sketch of this cause of action and its requirements as applied to Fletcher is
appropriate here.
California has been a forerunner in allowing recovery for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 468 P.2d 216,
86 Cal. Rptr. 88 (1970); State Rubbish Collector's Ass'n v. Silznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330,
240 P.2d 282 (1952). This recovery has been extended to situations wherein the
plaintiff has suffered an emotional disturbance without a connected physical injury.
Leavy v. Cooney, 214 Cal. App. 2d 496, 502, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580, 584 (1963).
The qualifications in an intentional infliction case, as recognized and cited by the
Fletcher court, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88, include: (1) outrageous
conduct on the part of the defendant, conceded by appellant, Id. at 392, 89 Cal. Rptr.
at 87; (2) defendant's intention of causing or reckless disregard of the probability of
causing emotional distress. Appellant conceded that the evidence was sufficient to sup-
port the jury's implied finding of the requisite intent or recklessness. Id. at 394, 89
Cal. Rptr. at 88; (3) plaintiff's suffering severe emotional distress. Severe emotional
distress means substantial or enduring as distinguished from trivial or transitory.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). "It is for the court to determine
whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to
determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed. It is our conclusion that there
is sufficient evidence from which emotional distress of the requisite severity can be
found and that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's determination that it
1971]
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This finding of causation is not inconsistent with appellant's argument
that the action sounds solely in contract, breach of which was stipulated.
21
He did contend, however, that no causal link between the sending of the
letters and the emotional distress existed. It may be consistent with sound
logic and established legal principles to construe Fletcher's emotional dis-
tress as arising independent of his economic losses. Fletcher testified that
he was frightened, worried and upset by Western National's letters, par-
ticularly those charging him with (a) the intentional misrepresentation of
facts on his application in order to procure the insurance coverage, and
(b) demanding repayment of a substantial sum of money and threatening
legal action against him if he failed or refused to cooperate. After being
notified that the $150.00 monthly payments were being discontinued and
as a result of all these communications by Western, Fletcher became
frightened and anxious about losing his home and his family lacking food
and clothing. The court, in finding that Fletcher's worry and anxiety
were substantial enough in quality, assumed the existence of causation, es-
pecially in view of the insurer's knowledge of Fletcher's disabled condi-
tion. Susceptibility of the plaintiff to emotional distress and a defendant's
awareness thereof, have often been mentioned as significant in determining
liability.22
In actuality, the court avoided the issue of whether a causal link could
be shown between the letters alone and the emotional harm:
Even if it were to be said that the theory of the pleadings was that the
instrumentality of the tort consisted of the two letters, the case was fully tried, and,
if the evidence established plaintiff's right to relief, the motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict were properly denied .... The doctrine limiting a
plaintiff to recovery on the theory of his pleadings has long since been repudiated.
(emphasis added) 23
Though the Fletcher court had an opportunity to discuss the issue of
causation extensively, they failed to do so. Their language in fact, demon-
strated a lack of confidence in holding upon the intentional infliction the-
ory:
We hold, therefore, that defendant's threatened and actual bad faith refusals to
make payments under the policy ... is conduct that may legally be the basis
in fact existed." 10 Cal. App. 3d at 397, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 90 quoting RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 46 comment j (1965); and (4) actual and proximate causation
of emotional distress by the defendant's outrageous conduct. Here, the court construed
the instrumentality of the tort to be the entire course of conduct of Western National
"from the moment they cut [Fletcher] off until they reinstated him." 10 Cal. App. 3d
at 399 n.9, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92, n.9.
21 Appellant reasoned that even if causation between the refusal to pay and the
emotional harm existed, compensation for emotional harm was not recoverable in an
action on a contract. See section III, infra.
22 See Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'r, Inc., 2 Cal. 3d 493, 499 n.3, 468 P.2d 216, 218
n.3, 86 Cal. Rptr. 88, 90 n.3 (1970) and authorities therein cited.
23 10 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92 (citations omitted).
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for an action for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (empha-
sis added) 2
4
By equivocating and not affirmatively stating that the tort of intentional
infliction is a definite basis for a holding under the given facts, the court is
qualifying itself and is inexorably looking for another hinge upon which
to base its holding:
Although it might be possible to rest our decision solely upon the first holding
[intentional infliction], we make the latter holding . . . [recovery based upon
the insurer's bad faith refusal to perform its contract obligation constituting a
tortious interference with a protected property interest of its insured.] (em-
phasis added)
25
This demonstrated lack of confidence is based primarily upon the insuf-
ficiency of the court's causation analysis. Implicit also in the court's
choice of an alternative holding is the realization of merit in the appel-
lant's argument that an action upon a bad faith refusal to pay is an action
upon a contract.
II
The fundamental difference between tort and contract lies in the nature of the
interest protected. Tort actions are created to protect the interest in freedom
from various kinds of harm. The duties of conduct which give rise to them are im-
posed by the law, and are based primarily upon social policy, and not necessarily
upon the will or intention of the parties. . . . Contract actions are created to
protect the interest in having promises performed.
2 6
Contract obligations arise because of conduct of the parties manifesting
assent, and are owed only to the specific individuals named in the con-
tract. Even as to these individuals, the damages recoverable for a breach
of a contractual duty are limited to those reasonably within the contempla-
tion of the parties when the contract was made,2 7 while in a tort action,
a much broader measure of damages is afforded.2 8  Generally speaking,
the tort remedy is likely to be more advantageous to the injured party in
the greater number of cases, if only because it will often permit the recov-
ery of greater damages. Where a case sounds both in contract and in
tort, the plaintiff will ordinarily have the freedom of election between
24 Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
25 Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
26 W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 634 (3d ed. 1964).
27 McCormick, The Contemplation Rule as a Limitation Upon Damages for Breach
of Contract, 19 MINN. L. Rv. 497 (1935), reprinted in C. McCoRMncK, DAMAGES,
ch. 22 (1935).
28 CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333 (West 1970), affords recovery in tort for all detriment
proximately caused the injured party, whether it could have been anticipated or not. Un-
der CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970), the general rule in California is that damages
may be recovered for breach of contract only if they may reasonably be supposed to
have been within the contemplation of the contracting parties at the time the contract
was made.
1971]
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them.2
9
Traditionally, where an insurer wrongfully cancelled, repudiated, or
terminated the contract of life or disability insurance, the action lay in
contract and only actual damages were recoverable.A0 The insured had
the option of pursuing one of three courses: "(1) he may elect to con-
sider the policy at an end and recover its just value or such measure of
damages as a court in the particular jurisdiction approves; (2) he may in-
stitute proceedings to have the policy adjudged to be in force; or (3) he
may tender the premiums, and if acceptance is refused, wait until the pol-
icy by its terms becomes payable and then test the forfeiture in a proper
action on the policy."31  Being that the insurer's action was held to be a
breach of a contractual obligation, if the insured elected to pursue option
(3) above, his maximum recovery was the sum(s) payable in the manner
and at the times as provided in the policy.32 The rationale for this limi-
tation was initially espoused in the old English case of Hadley v. Baxen-
dale33 and incorporated into California Civil Code section 3300.34 The gen-
eral rule, therefore, is that under section 3300, damages may be recovered for
breach of contract only if they may reasonably be supposed to have been
within the contemplation of the contracting parties, at the time the contract
was made, as a probable result of a breach.35
In life and disability insurance contracts, California Insurance Code section
10111 provides that liability under the policy shall be limited to the proceeds
payable. By comparing Civil Code section 3300 with Insurance Code
section 10111, one discovers a statutory declaration that in disability in-
surance policies, the amount of damages reasonably contemplated by the
'parties is the amount payable under the policy.
This was precisely the argument urged by appellant insurer's counsel at
the appellate level. He contended that since Fletcher achieved a declara-
tion of his entitlement to the contractual benefit by stipulation, any recov-
ery exceeding that amount, such as that awarded by the trial court, was
precluded by statute (Insurance Code section 10111) .36
29 Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952).
30 See generally, Annot., 107 A.L.R. 1233 (1937) and cases cited therein for a com-
prehensive discussion of the traditional options of the insured.
31 Id.
32 CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 10111 (West 1955); cf. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of
America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
33 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). See also C. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES ch. 22 (1935);
Bauer, Consequential Damages in Contract, 80 U. PA. L. REV. 687 (1932).
34 West Coast Winery v. Golden W. Wineries, 69 Cal. App. 2d 166, 158 P.2d 623
(1945); Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924).
35 Hunt Bros. Co. v. San Lorenzo Water Co., 150 Cal. 51, 87 P. 1093 (1906).
36 See Brief for Appellant at 42, Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
In addition, it can be argued that by accepting Western National's stipulation to
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It should be noted that the "contemplation of the parties" rule is not
static. Traditionally, damages for mental and physical suffering were
held not to follow from a breach of a contractual obligation, especially one
wherein the loss to the injured party was pecuniary. 37 Thus, in contracts
entered into for the accomplishment of commercial purposes, pecuniary,
interests are paramount and although a breach of contract may cause anx-
iety and worry, it can be argued that recovery for this anxiety and worry
was not contemplated by the parties as a natural and probable result of
the breach. As recently as 1966, a federal district court in Dawkins v.
National Liberty Life Insurance Company3s held that:
[Dlamages for mental suffering are too remote and consequential to be reason-
ably supposed within the contemplation of the parties to the contract of in-
surance. . . The claim for actual damages [is] limited to the payment of
the amounts due and owing within the coverage of the policy.
39
There are a long line of California cases which hold that a plaintiff may
not recover damages for mental suffering experienced as a result of a
breach of contract. Such recovery has generally been denied on the the-
ory that such damages were too uncertain, speculative, remote, and would
open the door to a flood of litigation.
40
Physical suffering or illness sustained as a proximate result of a breach
of contract was the first extension of the rule which limited recovery in
contract to damages for pecuniary loss only. Westervelt v. McCullough
41
enunciated that whenever the terms of a contract relate to matters which
directly concern the comfort or personal welfare of a party thereto, that
party may, in the event of a breach of the agreement, recover damages for
this physical suffering.
4 2
The impetus for extension in Westervelt was generated by an Alabama
decision, Browning v. Fies,43 which first alluded to the likelihood of re-
covery for mental anguish in a contract situation; but Browning was a
judgment, Fletcher made an election of remedies (contract) and was thereby precluded
from further relief in tort.
37 See Farmer's Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 343, 313 P.2d 404, 409
(1957):
To recover for mental suffering and anguish in an action for breach of contract,
the contract must be of such a nature that its breach would cause suffering for
reasons other than pecuniary loss. [citing RESTATEMENT OF CONMAcrs § 341
(1932)].
38 252 F. Supp. 800 (D.S.C. 1966).
39 Id. at 802-03. "[These damages] do not flow naturally and directly from the
breach of the contract." Id. at 802.
40 E.g., Westwater v. Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 73 P. 1055 (1903); Walpole v.
Prefab Mfg. Co., 103 Cal. App. 2d 472, 230 P.2d 36 (1951); See W. PRossER, LAw OF
TORTS 43 (3d ed. 1964) for argument contra.
41 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924).
42 Id. at 208-09, 228 P. at 738.
43 4 Ala. App. 580, 58 So. 931 (1912).
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qualified extension, for it required "special circumstances" known to both
parties at the time of entering into the contract and a contemplation that
damages may result from a breach under these circumstances. 44
The element of "bad faith" also served to expand the "contemplation of
the parties" doctrine. The California Supreme Court, in Overstreet v.
Merritt,45 held the defendant liable for all damages traceable to his breach,
including those which could not be foreseen at the time of the making
of the contract. Finally in 1958, Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
ance Company46 applied the Overstreet holding to an insurance contract situa-
tion wherein the insurer wrongfully denied coverage. The company was held
to be liable for the full amount which would compensate the insured for
all the detriment caused by the insurer's breach of the express and implied
obligations of the liability contract. The court stated that the policy con-
sideration behind its holding was not to permit the insurer to profit by its
own wrong.47  The impact of Comunale was to, for the first time, permit
recovery in excess of the policy limits.
Comunale opened the door for the court in Crisci v. Security Insurance
Company48 to discuss the recoverability of damages for mental suffering
when an insurer is held to commit a "bad faith" breach of its contractual
duty owed to the insured.49  Crisci took Comunale a step further by es-
pousing that:
an insurer should not be permitted to further its own interests by rejecting oppor-
tunities to settle within the policy limits -unless it is also willing to absorb losses
which may result from its failure to settle.50
What Crisci failed to delineate was whether damages for mental suffering
were recoverable solely on the ground of breach of contract. On the sur-
face it would appear that Crisci, in addition to employing the Comunale
"bad faith" rule, extended Westervelt by stating that a contract which di-
rectly concerns the comfort, happiness, or personal esteem of one of the
parties, should, because of those special circumstances, be a contract the
44 It is important to note that the relationship of the parties involved in Browning
differs from that of insurer-insured, for in Browning, the contract was between private
citizens, neither of whom were considered to have a superior bargaining position with
respect to the other.
45 186 Cal. 494, 200 P. 11 (1921).
46 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
47 Id. at 660, 328 P.2d at 202.
48 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
49 Although the Crisci court indicated a judicial willingness to impose quasi-strict
liability on an insurer when it, in bad faith, refused or failed to perform its contractual
obligations to its insured, this theory was not needed because the facts supported the
traditional tort recovery. This strict liability theory was offered to the Crisci court by
one of the amicus curiae briefs. See Brief of Mr. Edward L. Lascher as Amicus
Curiae, Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967).
50 Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
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breach of which results in damages for mental suffering. A closer reading
of Crisci, however, will reveal that the recovery of damages for mental
suffering might not have been allowed had the breach of contract not also
constituted a tort.51
The prevailing view with respect to recovery of damages for mental suf-
fering in breach of contract situations reveals a reluctance by the courts
to recognize mental suffering as an element of compensible damages.
This attitude has stemmed in part from a fear of being then called upon
to redress mere annoyance and hurt feelings. 52  The question remains
whether an action based upon the refusal to pay proceeds due under a
disability contract sounds solely in contract.
The past history of the unwillingness of the courts to extend damages
for mental suffering to breach of contract situations is calling out for an
extension. Though the tools necessary to make this extension were at
their fingertips, the Fletcher court declined to use them. Instead of hold-
ing that Mr. Fletcher's emotional harm was recoverable in an action on
the contract, which under the facts would have been supportable, the court
chose to base their holding on a tort theory, which affords a wider meas-
ure of recovery.53 It may be argued, and quite reasonably so, that the
court did this to, (a) avoid a determination on whether damages for
mental suffering were recoverable in an action based solely on a con-
tract;54 or (b) provide a new theory of recovery for the mass of insureds
who are placed in an inferior bargaining position in relation to the insur-
ance companies.
The duty of one party to conduct himself in a particular manner toward
another is a fundamental concept of tort theory. The Fletcher court un-
dertakes a discussion of a "special duty" imposed on a disability insurer
to conduct himself in a particular manner towards its insured, i.e. in "good
faith."'5 5 The duty concept in this factual situation is the backbone for
51 Recovery of damages for mental suffering in the instant case does not mean
that in every case of breach of contract the injured party may recover such dam-
ages. Here the breach also constitutes a tort. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 19.
52 The Crisci court notes merit to this objection by warning of the danger of fic-
titious claims and vexatious suits opening a "wide door" to litigation in the field of
trivialities and mere bad manners. Id.
53 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
54 Under CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West 1970), it is required that all damages for
breach of contract be within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time of
making the contract. It could be argued that damage to the health of Fletcher was
such an outcome as may have been reasonably within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of making the contract and a reasonably foreseeable result of a breach; for
did not Western National's agent contemplate the consequences of his threats and re-
fusals to pay a man in as impecunious a situation as was Mr. Fletcher? A strong af-
firmative argument can be made along this line. On this point, see Kline v. Guaranty
Oil Co., 167 Cal. 476, 483, 140 P. 1, 4 (1914).
55 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
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the court's declaration of a new cause of action sounding in tort. In order
to apply the duty element properly to the Fletcher facts, an examination
of the nature of the insurer's duty with respect to its insured and an ex-
planation of what constitutes "good or bad faith" is in order.
Most individuals seeking insurance coverage, after deciding upon the
variety of insurance required by them, are unable to negotiate the con-
tents of the policy with the insurer, since all companies issue policies with
substantially identical terms5 6 Life in our complex and economically
oriented society make certain types of insurance coverage indispensable to
a reasonably prudent man. This situation thereby places the insurance
companies in a superior bargaining position with respect to potential in-
sureds. It has, in fact, been held to be a form of adhesion contract.
5 7
Thus, the individual is confronted with the choice of either accepting
the standard insurance policy drafted by the insurer, or risking financial
disaster by not obtaining insurance at all. These realities necessitate the
imposition of a "special duty" on the part of the insurance company to-
ward its insureds. As early as 1934, the California court had occasion to
comment upon this insurer-insured relationship. It stated a rule in Stark
v. Pioneer Casualty Company58 which imposed a broader legal responsibility
upon the insurance carrier than would be imposed upon parties to a
purely private contract. 59 A major North Dakota decision held that a
"special duty" arose in the insurer, due to the unequal bargaining posi-
tions of the parties.60  The nature of this so called "special duty" places
the responsibility upon the insurer to give as much consideration to the
interests of the insured as it gives to its own,6' and requires the insurer to
56 Schultz, The Special Nature of the Insurance Contract: A Few Suggestions for
Further Study, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 376-77 (1950) (describes the nature of the
insurance contract).
57 It is well settled that insurance policies are characteristic of contracts of adhe-
sion. Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 269-70, 419 P.2d 168, 171-72, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104, 107-08 (1966); see generally, Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doc-
trine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964); Kessler, Contracts of Ad-
hesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLuM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
58 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P.2d 731 (1934).
59 This is based upon the fact that those companies act under franchises from
the state, and the policy of the state in granting such franchises proceeds upon the
theory that it is in the interest of the public to the end that indemnity upon spe-
cific contingencies should be provided those who are eligible and desire it, and for
their protection the state regulates, inspects and supervises their business.
Id. at 580, 34 P.2d at 732.
Stark was a contract formation case, wherein the insurer was held to a duty to act
promptly upon the insured's application for insurance. This "special duty" was im-
posed by virtue of the nature of the transaction and the relationship of the parties.
60 Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940).
See also Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962).
61 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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exercise "good faith" in dealing with the insured.
A careful examination of the California cases which have broadened the
insurer's duty to the insured, will yield the finding that this extension has
only been applied to liability insurers. 62 The general policy reasons are
well espoused in Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company:63
Because of the "quasi-public" nature of the insurance business and the relation-
ship between the insurer and the insured, . . . , the rights and obligations of the
insurer cannot be determined solely on the basis of rules pertaining to private
contracts negotiated by individual parties of relatively equal bargaining strength. 64
The policy basis of encouraging fair treatment of the public whom these
enterprises serve would therefore, bring about implied-in-law duties to-
ward the insured. Thus, the court in Barrera recognized the insurance
company's role as one of a quasi-public entity.
65
More specifically, the courts have broadened the liability insurer's duty
by a full recognition of the status of the insurer and its relationship to in-
nocent third parties. California courts have consistently subordinated the
contract provision of liability insurance policies to compensate innocent
third party victims.66 Beginning with Continental Casualty Company v. Phoe-
nix Construction Company,67 the language of automobile liability insurance
policies has been viewed in light of the public policy of California's Financial
Responsibility Law.66 The court stated that the objective of this law is to pro-
vide protection to those injured on the highways through no fault of their
own. 69 It would therefore follow that because of the quasi-public nature-
of the insurance business and the public policy underlying the Financial
Responsibility Law, the "special duty" was owed to the public.
70
Fletcher seeks to bring an insured under a disability policy within the
"special duty" umbrella. The duty has never before been so extended,
presumably because the two party nature of the disability insurance con-
62 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674,
79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
328 P.2d 198 (1958); Stark v. Pioneer Cas. Co., 139 Cal. App. 577, 34 P.2d 731
(1934).
63 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1969).
64 Id. at 669, 456 P.2d at 681-82, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 113.
65 Id. For a comprehensive discussion of the Barrera decision and related matters, in-
cluding the "special duty" of a liability insurers, see Note, Reasonable Investigations and
the Financial Responsibility Law-Protecting The Innocent Third Party, 3 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 169 (1970).
66 Note, supra note 65, at 174.
67 46 Cal. 2d 423, 296 P.2d 801 (1956).
68 Note, supra note 65, at 174 n.33.
69 46 Cal. 2d at 434, 296 P.2d at 808.
70 Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 668, 456 P.2d 674,
680-81, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112-13 (1969).
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tract distinguishes it from liability insurance contracts. There are, how-
ever, strong reasons for making the extension.
One might begin with the concept that all contracts require the parties
to deal with one another in good faith. In addition, insurance contracts,
whether disability or otherwise, are adhesion contracts;71 a basis of the
"special duty" is the superior bargaining position of the insurer. Cor-
relatively, all insureds have an equal right to rely on the peace of mind
and security that insurance provides for them.
72
The Fletcher court's analogy to Crisci is well taken. 73  Crisci, to be
sure, was a liability insurance case. But the "special duty" found therein
was one owed not to third parties but to the insured. The quasi-public
nature of liability insurance did not in any real sense effect the court's
conclusion.
Further, it is arguable that a disability policy affects third parties in
much the same way that a liability policy affects them. Note that the
"special duty" is not limited to liability policies solely. It has been held in
other jurisdictions to apply to life insurance as well, on the grounds that the
purpose of such insurance is to benefit third persons, presumably the family of
the insured. 74 Effectively, the reasons which have led courts to hold liability
insurers "quasi-public" also apply to life insurance. The real purpose of
the insurance, as understood by both the insurer and the insured, is the
protection of innocent third parties.
Just as life insurance takes on a quasi-public tint, so does disability in-
surance. The real purpose behind acquisition of the policy is protection
of the family. In Fletcher, for example, the persons injured by Western's
failure to pay are, excepting Fletcher, third parties: his wife and eight
children.
In liability or life insurance, the proceeds are paid directly to a third
party. The protection of third parties which disability insurance affords
is no less demonstrable because the mechanics of tendering payment di-
rectly are absent. In an enlightening statement made with regard to the in-
surer-insured relationship and which made no distinction between liabil-
ity and disability insurers, Roscoe Pound in 1921 took the position that:
The law of insurance (has been taken] out of the category of contact, and
we have established that the duties of public service companies are not con-
tractual, as the 19th century sought to make them, but are instead relational; they
do not flow from agreements which the public servant may make as he chooses,
the calling in which he is engaged and his consequent relation to the public. (em-
phasis added) 75
71 See note 57 supra.
72 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 434, 426 P.2d 173, 179, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13, 19 (1967).
73 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
74 Bekken v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122, 293 N.W. 200 (1940).
75 R. PouND, Tim SPnrr OF Tm COMMON LAW 29 (1921).
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Neither Crisci nor the quasi-public rationale of liability insurance pre-
clude extension of the "special duty" to disability insurers. The Fletcher
court rested on solid ground in holding that a "special duty" of "good-
faith and fair dealing", which requires an insurer to give equal considera-
tion to the interests of its insured as it does to its own, applies to disability
as well as liability insurers.
The Fletcher court never adequately discusses the concept of "bad
faith" in an insurer's dealings with an insured. A discussion of it here will
help clarify the court's use of this terminology and shed the proper illumi-
nation on the nature of the insurer's duty toward its insured.
Initially "bad faith" was defined quite narrowly. In City of Wakefield
v. Globe Indemnity Company,76 the court stated that "[g]ood or bad faith is a
state of mind".77 This line of reasoning was perhaps carried to its ex-
treme in a Vermont case, Johnson v. Hardware Mutual Casualty Company.78
The holding denoted that liability for "bad faith" could be imposed only
for actions done "with actual intent to mislead or deceive another. It
refers to a real and actual state of mind . . . It will not be imputed unless
there is something in the particular transaction which is equivalent to
fraud, actual or constructive." 79  The Vermont court realized the ex-
tremity of its holding. Upon rehearing, it relaxed its definition: "[T]he
intentional disregard of the financial interests of the [insured] in the hope
of escaping the full responsibility imposed on it by its policy."80  In light
of the Johnson court's new definition of bad faith, it may well be argued
that the Fletcher court meant to construe the insurer's breach of faith
consistent with the new Johnson definition, i.e., that Western National, by
its actions in writing the letters, attempted to escape their full responsibility
to Fletcher under the policy and this very action constituted bad faith with
respect to the interests of the insured.
Traditionally, the determination of whether the insurance company was
acting in good faith toward its policy holders was once again limited to
liability policies. The most widely litigated area wherein breach of "good
faith" by the insurer was an issue was in claim settlement disputes. Be-
ginning with the landmark case of Hilker v. Western Auto Insurance Com-
pany,8' and extending down through Comunale v. Traders & General Insur-
76 246 Mich. 645, 225 N.W. 643 (1929).
77 Id. at 653, 225 N.W. at 645.
78 108 Vt. 269, 187 A. 788 (1936).
70 Id. at 286, 187 A. at 796.
80 Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 109 Vt. 481, 491, 1 A.2d 817, 820 (1938).
For another definition of "bad faith" as dishonesty or fraud, see Harrod v. Meridian
Mut. Ins. Co., 389 S.W.2d 74 (Ky. 1964).
81 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'd on rehearing, 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W.
413 (1931).
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ance Company82 and Crisci v. Security Insurance Company,8 3 the courts have
broadened the requirement of good faith by holding the insurer to (1) give at
least as much consideration to the interests of the insured as it gives to its
own, and (2) exercise reasonable judgment, taking into account all of the
circumstances known or that reasonably should be known, in paying off or
settling a claim by its insured.84
A true fiduciary must refrain from a consideration of all self interests
which would place those interests over that of his principal.85 By re-
quiring the insurance company to act reasonably and in good faith to
settle claims against the insured by a third person, the court in Crisci is in
fact treating the insurer as a quasi-fiduciary of the insured. The stand-
ard of conduct to which Security Insurance was held with respect to Mrs.
Crisci was sufficiently high so as not to permit injury to her interests.
At the time of Crisci, bad faith was determined by the state of mind
of the insurer in its dealings with the insured. If it were found that the
insurer attempted to avoid its contractual obligation, it was not then act-
ing in a quasi-fiduciary capacity and giving equal consideration to the in-
terests of the insured. The insurer thereby breached its implied-in-law duty,
imposed as a result of the nature of the relationship. It was this duty that
the court in Fletcher extended to disability insurers.
I
Appellant argued, in respect to its bad faith refusal to pay, that an
action based thereon must sound only in contract. That argument loses
significance once the Crisci duty of good faith and fair dealing is extended
to disability insurers. The Fletcher court correctly made that extension.
That court, however, was not content to rest its holding upon an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress ground. Consistent with its defini-
tion of the extra-contractual duty owed, it proceeded to an alternative
holding. It sought to achieve its objectives by creating a new right of ac-
tion in tort.
The duty of Western National to act in good faith and deal fairly with
Mr. Fletcher being established, the court made an application of it to the
insurer's conduct and found that this duty was breached:
82 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
83 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
84 For a full discussion of the "reasonableness" requirements, see Davy v. Public
Nat1 Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App. 2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1960).
This standard of due care is gradually moving in the direction of tort law. See
Radcliffe v. Franklin Natl Ins. Co., 208 Ore. 1, 298 P.2d 1002 (1956). The court
also indicated that agency law could control if the insurer were regarded as either an
agent or a fiduciary of the insured.
85 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 387 and 393, and comments b & d (1958).
[Vol. 4
NOTES
Sjuch conduct[8 6] on the part of a disability insurer constitutes a tortious
interference with a protected property interest[87J of its insured for which
damages may be recovered ... for all detriment proximately resulting there-
from, including economic loss as well as emotional distress resulting from the
conduct or from the economic losses caused by the conduct .... (emphasis
added)88
By holding that the insurer's conduct was in essence a tortious inter-
ference which "resulted, and could be expected to result in both economic
loss and emotional distress",8 9 the court, under the guise of a "new tort",
a bad faith refusal to perform one's own contractual obligation, can be
said to have extended the traditional measures of contract recovery.
Unfortunately, the Fletcher court has omitted a cause in fact applica-
tion of this new tort to the given facts, although as has been demonstrated,
causation could have been established. In lieu of an adequate discussion
of the causal connection between Fletcher's harm and Western's conduct,
the court has redefined the nature of the duty owed by a disability insurer
to its insured for the following reasons: (1) From a policy standpoint, there
are at least two advantages. First, others in a quasi-public enterprise in the
public interest should be deterred from refusing to perform their contractual
obligations in bad faith. It would be unconscionable to allow insurance com-
panies to get by with merely paying the benefits due under the original
policy of insurance while they engaged in this malicious and "bad faith"
conduct.9 0  Second, the new tort would engender public respect and confi-
dence in the judicial process by permitting recovery of all proximately
caused damages in a single cause of action;91 (2) The court was reluc-
tant to extend the holding in Crisci9 2 (wherein the breach by the insur-
ance company was considered both in contract and in tort) so as to find
damages for mental suffering based solely on contract recoverable. By
holding in tort, this extension of Crisci is tautly avoided; (3) Exemplary
damages, which seek to deter bad faith and malicious conduct, are not
recoverable in an action based on a contractual obligation, even if the
86 "Such conduct" refers to the insurer's actions in embarking on a concerted
course of activities to induce Fletcher to surrender his policy or enter into a disadvan-
tageous "settlement" of a non-existent dispute by means of false and threatening letters
and the employment of economic pressure based around Fletcher's disabled condition.
This was brought about by Western National's malicious and bad faith refusal to pay
Fletcher's legitimate claim, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 392, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 87.
87 "Contract rights are property, and as such are entitled to the protection of the
law. Second Nat'l Bank v. Samuel & Sons, 12 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1926).
88 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
89 Id. at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
90 An insurer who acts maliciously in refusing to perform his contract with its
insured would run no risk of liability to this insured beyond that of paying what it was
already obligated to pay, that is, its contractual obligation. Therefore, punitive dam-
ages are proper here as a deterrent. Restitution would have little or no deterrent effect.
91 Id.
92 Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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breach is wilful and malicious. 3 They are recoverable when an action
sounds in tort. These exemplary damages may be recoverable on a proper
showing of malice, fraud, or oppression, even though the tort incidentally
involves a breach of contract.94 By recognizing these limitations of dam-
age recovery in contract, the Fletcher court sought to apply a broader
measure of damages to the given facts; (4) When a case sounds in tort,
California Insurance Code section 10111 does not restrict recovery to the
amounts due under the policy;95 and (5) The court exhibited a compas-
sionate feeling for the plight of Mr. Fletcher while, at the same time, ex-
pressing vehement outrage at the despicable conduct of insurer Western
National.
The new tort enunciated in Fletcher protects dual interests: Free-
dom from emotional distress and freedom from economic losses as a con-
sequence of a breach of contract.9 6 The rationale behind this consolidation
is that this new tort will square with the economic, social, and legal realities
of the problem presented.
An acceptance of this extension may be said to, in fact, accede to a
merger of tort and contract. Thus, the holding in Fletcher would then
square with the attitude of Justice Finley of the Washington Supreme Court,
who, in a recent dissenting opinion, stated:
The actual damage to [a plaintiff] . .. is the same whether the cause of action
be characterized as one sounding in tort or contract. To make the amount
of . . . recovery differ, depending on the characterization of her action as tort
or contract, is simply to pay homage to the ghost of the common law forms of
action and thereby allow them to "rule us from their graves".9 7  )
There can be no doubt that the Court of Appeal's decision in Fletcher
extended the law in tort. The effect of its decision was to merge a cause
of action in contract into a tort action where one party in bad faith re-
fuses to perform its contractual obligations. Can it be said that the court
intended this merger to apply to non-insurance contracts in which one
party, in bad faith, refuses to perform? If so, it appears that any bad
faith breach of contract would be a tort, with damages recoverable for
all detriment suffered by the injured party, whether anticipated or not.
This would then comprehend mental suffering which included: nervous-
ness, grief, anxiety, worry, shock, humiliation, indignity, and physical in-
93 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1970).
94 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1970); Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America,
265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
95 Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co. of America, 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 927-29,
71 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767-69 (1968).
96 Note that this recovery for economic losses differs from the recovery for same
in tort. In tort, the economic losses must flow from a wrong to the individual or his
property whereas in contract, the losses may result solely from a breach of an en-
forcible agreement.
97 Carpenter v. Moore, 51 Wash. 2d 795, 809, 322 P.2d 125, 133 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
[Vol. 4226
NOTES
juries and pains, provided that they naturally ensue and are proximately
caused by the wrongful act.0 8 Factual situations such as Browning v.
Fies,09 Westervelt v. McCullough,100 and Chelini v. Nieri'0 1 involve purely
personal and non-commercial contracts, where the parties are not multi-
million dollar conglomerates such as insurance companies, but rather indi-
vidual members of the community. Parties in situations such as these would
be subjected to potential liability in tort which neither of them contemplated
when entering into the contract nor would ever be likely to pay in the event
of a breach. If Fletcher were so extended, ordinary citizens would be dis-
couraged from entering into contractual arrangements with each other. The
sanctity and stability of contract would be gone forever.
Unfortunate dicta in Fletcher aside, 10 2 a further extension to non-in-
surance contracts is highly unlikely. As has been shown, the basis of the
Fletcher holding is the "special" extra-contractual duty which is unique
to insurance contracts. That "special duty" being absent in non-insurance
contracts, an extension of Fletcher to them is unwarranted.
The holding in Fletcher also has widespread consequences to the insur-
ance industry as well as to the insurance buying public. By extending the
Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Company'03 and Crisci v. Security
98 See CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1970).
00 4 Ala. App. 580, 58 So. 931 (1912).
100 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 P. 734 (1924).
101 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948).
102 Brief mention should be made of the court's analogy to the tort of intentional
interference with contractual relations. The court reasons that if a third party would
have acted toward Fletcher as did Western National, that person would be equally as
guilty of tortious conduct as was Western and would thereby be held responsible to
Fletcher for all damages proximately caused thereby, and in the proper case, punitive
damages. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. Though it may be more im-
portant to protect contracting parties against invasions from the outside, an argument
may be made for extending this protection to the parties to the contract, especially
where the contract calls for a "special duty" from one party toward the other.
An attack on this argument can be made with regard to the Fletcher facts. It is
recognized in most jurisdictions today that an action in tort for damages will be al-
lowed against a defendant who has unjustly induced a third person to breach a contract
with a plaintiff (the cases are collected in Annot., 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933) and in Annot.,
26 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952)) or who has otherwise interfered with the contractual rela-
tionships of others. See generally Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations, 41
HARv. L. REV. 728, 731-32 (1928); Note, Tortious Interference with Contractual Rela-
tions, 31 HARV. L. REv. 1017 (1918) and cases cited therein. An action for inter-
ference has never been extended to a party to the contract, see e.g., Hein v. Chrysler
Corp., 45 Wash. 2d 586, 277 P.2d 708 (1954). If the Fletcher court's reasoning were
logically extended, then every party who would breach his contract with another would
be liable, not only for his breach (in an action on the contract) but would also be
held for intentionally interfering with a contractual relation and be subject to exorbitant
liability in damages. This is surely not what the court was driving at by making their
analogy.
103 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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Insurance Company10 4 decisions, all insurers now have an implied-in-law duty
of "good faith and fair dealing" with respect to their insureds. There is now
no distinction whether their dealings with the insured regard payments to him
or to an outside third party. This good faith requirement imposes upon all
insurers a duty to give their policy holder's interests at least as much con-
sideration as it gives to its own. And, of course, a "new tort" is only as
expansive as the duty which underlies it.
Spencer Daniel Proffer
104 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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